Muslim Women in American Society (©Dec. 2010 - Religion & Society Class)
Since the fatal attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the religion of Islam has become the enemy within the American culture. At the center of America’s fear and hate is the symbol of hijab, a headscarf which symbolizes for Americans the oppressed Muslim woman who needs liberation from her backward and violent faith. For the Muslim women, however, the hijab is an important part of their religious and cultural heritage. They claim the right to freely choose to wear this religious symbol of piety and submission to Allah in an American culture which values freedom of religion. To Muslims both male and female, the American women are the ones who need liberation from America’s sexualized, disrespectful construction of true womanhood. To them the Qur’an offers gender equality and respect between the sexes, not inequality and oppression. It is increasingly difficult for American Muslim women to create an identity that marries the apparently opposing factions of America and Islam. Yet an essential part of this newly constructed identity is the hijab, which for the women marries the best of America (freedom of religion and equality) and Islam (modesty and piety).
ISLAM IN THE AMERICAN CONSCIOUS
Multiple authors recognize the separation in American society between “us” (Christian America) and “them” (Islam). Nada Elia, in an article entitled “Islamophobia and the ‘Privileging’ of Arab American Women,” believes that America’s advocacy of plurality does not carry over into religion (2006). It is predominately a Christian culture which paints a picture of “us,” the Christian community, versus “them,” the Islamic community. American society is riddled with both covert and overt forms of rejection which has lead to a “systematic erasure of Arab Americans from the ‘American’ consciousness” (2006:156). Arab Americans are erased from political discourses and multiculturalism (Elia 2006). Instead, the media generally represents Arabs as foreign villains who stand in opposition to American democratic values. The overt strands of rejection can be traced to the “legalized racial profiling” post-9/11 (Elia 2006:156). This includes the extra security measures put in place at the airports which seem to specifically target Arab Muslim Americans who are identified through their distinctive garb.
Part of America’s Islamophobia is the “privileging” of American Muslim women over their male counterparts who are viewed “as a menace to American society” (Elia 2006:155). Through a combination of racism and sexism, Arab women are given a greater public vocal presence then their male relatives (Elia 2006). This trend can be seen in bookstores and libraries where mostly Arab women writers are featured, and specifically those women who denounce Islam as a faith of violence and oppression (Elia 2006). Elia claims that “these Muslim women’s oppressors were invariably perceived to be their male relatives rather than the racist, exclusionary, and often violent dominant American discourse” (2006:157).
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad brings up as similar argument in his article entitled “The Post-9/11 Hijab as Icon.” Colonialists, long before 9/11, perceived Eastern men as inferior to them. Paintings from that time period present images of “vulnerable, naked women who need to be rescued by Western men” from the clutches of the barbarian Eastern men (Haddad 2007:259). Even within the paintings are marked differences between the Eastern men and women. They “present a sharp contrast between ugly, loathsome, evil (dark skinned) Eastern men and beautiful, voluptuous, innocent (light skinned) Eastern women” (Haddad 2007:259). Since 9/11, the American media has painted a different picture of oppression. With greater attention given to the Taliban atrocities, many Americans began to view Muslim women as slaves to their own religion. The new American wars in the Middle East are justified by America’s goal of liberating Eastern women from the evils of Islam (Haddad 2007).
The Muslim Women League (MWL) located in Los Angles believes that traditional Islam actually brings liberation to women, not oppression. In an article entitled “Issues of Concern for Muslim Women,” the League attempts to distinguish between cultural constructs and authentic Islamic religion. They condemn the shaping of Islamic laws to fit “political agendas” which oppress women with their “sexist and authoritarian attitudes” (1995). To the MWL, these laws “hardly resembled the original Islamic community led by Muhammad” (1995). They describe Islam as a religion which guarantees equality:
During Spring semester 2010, I had the opportunity to visit during afternoon prayers Al-Sabeel Mosque in San Francisco. It was an interesting immersion into a different religion that I’m familiar with only through media and classes. A lot of media since 9/11 has portrayed Islam as a religion of violence and hatred, but I found the particular community of Al-Sabeel to be a radical departure from the normal stereotype. The moment I entered the Mosque I was treated with respect, warmth, and hospitality. The Mosque name “Al-Sabeel” means “Path to the Light” and the Mosque truly tries to be a path to what they deem as truth. They welcome everyone into their community, whether Muslim or not, and in fact provide headsets which translate the Imam’s message for non-Arabic speakers. After the afternoon prayer, Al-Sabeel provided refreshments and allowed my group to interact with the Sheikh. He was able to speak some English but most of what he communicated was through an interpreter, Mohammed Allababidi, who is also his personal assistant. Later Sheikh Morsy’s daughters, Nosiba and Rofida Morsy, went to dinner with me. Nosiba and Rofida are in their early twenties and grew up in America. They explained that their father was born in Egypt, moved to Yemen where his two eldest girls were born, then moved the family to Michigan to start a mosque. According to Rofida, her father founded Muath ibn Jabal Mosque and successfully petitioned to broadcast the call to prayer over loudspeakers outside. Once that mosque became successful the Morsy family moved on to San Francisco.
He started Al-Sabeel in 2002 in the Tenderloin district, San Francisco’s poorest neighborhood. The Sheikh explained that he endeavors to create a diverse community of Muslim believers who are intimately involved with community projects in the city. He continually emphasized that Islam promotes life, not death. At the time I was interning as a chaplain, so he suggested that I should keep Muslim patients from dwelling on death by pointing believers toward life, the opportunities that lie ahead, and the gifts they have been given. Another common theme was Morsy’s distinction between culture and religion. He purposefully tried to distance himself from the radical, oppressive Islamist countries in the Middle East by setting Al-Sabeel’s traditions in opposition to other nations. For instance, while some members of the Mosque from the Middle East might complain that he doesn’t wear traditional Islamic garbs, the Shiekh argues that the garb imams wear are culturally ascribed and thus not required. The Quran does not set out rules governing what they should wear. In fact, to the Shiekh complications in religion is by definition human not divinely created. His reasoning is that Allah wants a religion that is easy to follow. It is humans who complicate all the issues.
In some follow-up research, I ran across an article printed in the Wall Street Journal which describes Sheikh Safwat Morsy as an extremist Muslim. According to Waldman (2006), a conflict arose between Morsy and another imam named Souleiman Ghali. Morsy was fired from Ghali’s mosque, Islamic Society, for allegedly preaching radical Islamist ideals which supported martyrdom and the overthrow of the American government. Morsy filed a wrongful-termination suit in April 2003, claiming he was fired for uncovering some shady accounting. He opened Al-Sabeel a year earlier in a basement less than a block away from the Islamic Society. Waldman (2006) claims that Morsy “see[s] attempts to tailor the religion to Western norms as cultural capitulation verging on blasphemy.” In court, several congregants claimed he supported Palestinian suicide bombers and praised them for fighting against Israel and America. Waldman (2006) also claims that Morsy left the mosque in Michigan due to divisions on the board concerning Morsy’s preaching. In contrast, Rofida claimed they left because the mosque became too large and no longer needed her father’s guiding hand. But all these details became fair game in the trial in 2003. In the end, the jury ruled in favor of Sheikh Morsy and awarded him $200,000 in damages (Waldman 2006). The clinch was the Sheikh’s own testimony, self-professed pacifism, and the support of his family of seven daughters. Later I went to dinner with Nosiba and Rofida Morsy and discussed contemporary issues with them. Neither woman appeared to hold the extreme ideals of fundamentalist Muslims, despite holding more conservative beliefs. Perhaps the conflict between Morsy and Ghali was exacerbated by America’s Islamophobia.
SYMBOLIC POWER OF THE HIJAB
Sociologists recognize that the hijab (headscarf) has become a powerful symbol for both American Muslims and the general American culture. For Americans, the hijab seems to personify “Islamic militancy, extremism, jihadism, and oppression of women” (Haddad 2007:255). Stefano Allievi believes even the English translation of hijab as ‘veil’ carries strong implicit and psychological power, because it leads to an understanding that the veil is something that “separates, conceals, masks, or blocks the view” (Allievi 2006:120). In other words, it challenges the American ideal of equality by apparently forcing an individual to separate herself from the greater society by concealing herself with a headscarf. For American Muslims, the hijab is liberation from the Western women’s enslavement “to their obligation to be beautiful and available, on pain of being rejected” (Allievi 2006:120). It is also a public declaration of their faith which constructs a Muslim identity that revolves around piety and authenticity (Mir 2009). It also carves out an autonomous space for women to pursue jobs while also holding to their “traditional obligations of religion and family” (Mule and Barthel 1992:324). The hijab seamlessly combines their American and Muslim roots to create a hybrid identity that embraces the equality and religious freedom of America while also criticizing America for its sexuality and its vilification of their faith.
Shabana Mir’s study of Muslim undergraduate women illuminates the tricky balancing act of projecting “normalcy” while also differentiating themselves from their dominant majority peers’ gendered behavior (2009). For Muslim communities, youth do not date or display physical affection in public, a norm which is extremely different from the experience of American youth. Mir studied 26 Muslim undergraduate women, raised in the United States, who either attended Georgetown or George Washington University in Washington D.C. Mir discovered that the awkwardness of not having a boyfriend was mediated by half silences which preserved “an appearance of normalcy—the hint that she could have a real boyfriend (which implies a sexual relationship)—rather than say that she would not” (2009:240). Through these half silences, Muslim women often pass as normal by remaining in ambiguity and yet also distance themselves from their majority peers’ behavior by not simulating their behavior (2009). Mir calls this “normal difference.” This projection of normalcy is an attempt to correct American stereotypes (“Muslim women are backward and lack agency”) with their view (“Muslim women are normal, modern, and free”) (Mir 2009:250).
Mir’s research also uncovered the importance of the hijab in differentiating their Muslim identity from their dominant American peers. Charlise, a recent black convert, resists wearing the hijab because it “would maker her Muslim womanness concrete, remove her from a gray zone of elastic identity, and require the confirmation of a complete, consistent public performance (Mir 2009:244). By wearing the hijab, she feels the need and would want to act according to the image it creates (Mir 2009). The hijab carries with it a certain Muslim persona of piety and modesty that would restrict interactions with the opposite sex. Other women in Mir’s research, however, attempt to challenge perceptions of correct hijabi behaviors with non-hijabi behaviors. One such woman is Zeinab who wears the hijab but also develops close friendships with guys. Mir theorizes that because Zeinab is a member of “two demographically sizable and socioeconomically powerful communities,” she feels more comfortable in her identity as a Muslim and can thus challenge traditional perceptions (2009:244). In contrast, recent converts like Charlise stand on shaker ground and must conform to, rather than challenge, traditional expectations of a hijabi (Mir 2009).
In Rhys H. Williams’ and Gira Vashi’s study of Muslim youth reinforces the idea that the hijab carves out cultural space in which “second-generation Muslim young people [can] negotiate their dual identities as Muslims and Americans and gives them the opportunity to be part of both worlds” (2007:272). In Williams and Vashi’s interviews, two cultural contexts stood out as important to understanding young Muslim Americans: (1) America’s value of equal rights and (2) critiques of America’s moral standards. In the context of America’s value of equality, “treating all people the same” stands supreme (2007:275). Part of equal treatment involves dismantling barriers that might stand in the way of women’s involvement in the public arena and rejecting “any institutionally authorized sanctioning of behavior that separates the sexes” (2007:275). Under this pretext, the hijab is often vilified by the American public as a symbol of Muslim women’s second-class status (2007). In the context of Muslim critiques of America’s materialism and sexuality, respondents combined America’s allegedly moral breakdown with a general distrust of human nature when it came to sexual impulses (2007). Two concerns were apparent: either women are threatened by men’s inability to control their sexual drives or women threatened men’s purity (2007).
Muslim youth, then, must negotiate these apparently opposite viewpoints. In regards to the first context, respondents went out of their way to deny that Islam promoted gender inequality (Williams and Vashi 2007). Equality in Islam means a recognition that both sexes complement each other in terms of their function and contributions (2007). Some even claimed women were more advantaged because they could save their own money, whereas men must share their wealth with their family (2007). This is exemplified in the Muslim Women’s League’s literature:
In regards to the second context, the hijab provides protection from sexual desires for both the men and the women (Williams and Vashi 2007). Rofida Morsy in my interview reflected a similar concern. The hijab to her represented modesty but she took it a step further in relating this separation between men and women to the mosque structure. She said that the separation of women and men during prayer was to allow both genders the opportunity to focus on Allah. She claims that if they worshipped together, young men would be distracted by women. Essentially, they would focus on impressing the women or struggle with sexual thoughts when they should be focused on worshipping Allah. In her case, the hijab does not fully shield young men from sexual thoughts. There is an added need for physical walls to separate men and women.
The young women in Williams and Vashi’s study also emphasized that they chose to wear the hijab despite feeling peer pressure and social expectations to make that decision (2007). Women felt by wearing the hijab they gained more respect from men because the headscarf is a visible representation of Islam and their religious values (2007). With that respect, they gained more independence:
The young women embrace their public roles, autonomy, and chosen religion, which are inalienable rights in American society, while also donning the hijab as a distinct, traditional Muslim identity.
Rofida Morsy likewise emphasized the fact that she chose when to start wearing the head covering. She claims that technically girls begin covering their hair after they start their period, but she chose to start wearing it sooner. She wanted to mirror her older sisters and publically display her Muslim identity. To her it is an extremely important religious observance of modesty. When asked if she could have chosen not to wear the hijab, she answered yes. However, it was clear that her family would be disappointed in that choice and that there was an implicit expectation that she would wear the hijab. Her decision also reflects the conservative culture of Al-Sabeel mosque. All female attendees wear the scarf and I myself wore one when I visited out of respect.
Pat Mule and Diane Barthel in their study elaborate on how the hijab treads the fine line between autonomy and traditional values. While it focuses mainly on the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in developing countries, I think it has some bearing on Muslim American women’s perception of the hijab. In America, we have traditionally evaluated the status of women in developing countries in terms of autonomy and economic options alone (1992). Mule and Barthel argue that women’s status in society is complicated and involves a measure of autonomy but also social esteem (1992). “The traditional esteem attached to the veil are real” in its consequences (1992:326). There are costs attached to autonomy and benefits attached to traditional social esteem which increase in traditional societies and cultures (1992). Again, there is recognition that Eastern societies view Western women as sexually promiscuous. Muslim women risk associating themselves with this image if they do not wear the hijab, so “the veil is a symbol of Muslim women’s silent protest against the imposition of alien cultural constructs and ideologies that threaten to alienate them from their own heritage and to result in a loss of esteem within the patriarchal system” (1992:327). In these patriarchal societies, public spaces are often the domain of men (1992). By wearing the hijab, women can enter into gendered spaces without fear of harassment and thus, achieve some autonomy (1992). It also gives single women a degree of modest and dignity which will only be fully assured them in marriage (1992)
The hijab in America seems to achieve a similar goal. One woman in Stefano Allievi’s study describes the hijab as providing protection, identity, belonging, and even controlling deviant behavior:
The symbol of the hijab becomes so strong that individuals within and outside the community treat the women differently. Within the Islamic community, women can enter male spaces and know that they will be accorded respect. In turn, the hijab signals to men that the woman is pious, modest, and wholly other than their promiscuous American mainstream counterparts. This distinction in Islam between the pure and impure (haram/halal) is brought to the forefront when a woman clothes herself in a veil (Allievi 2006). In a way, she brings the sacred into the profane space. The hijab also seems to mark-out women as potential marriage partners. It visibly affirms the modesty, celibacy, and piety of an unmarried hijabi woman, something that pious Muslim men would look for. An anonymous writer on the Muslim Women’s League’s website writes:
Yet women must also pay a price when they wear traditional clothing in a nontraditional society. After 9/11, Rofida Morsy says she experienced a lot of stares and rude comments. At first she either rudely stared back or stuck-out her tongue in response to other American’s reaction to the hijab. Now she says she experiences less discrimination and learned how to cope with the occasional unwanted attention. Besides unwanted attention, Allievi points out that hijabi women run the risk of either being unable to find a job or possibly even losing their job because of dress codes. He believes the job problem is often mitigated by opening religious businesses such as an Islamic clothing line (2006:139). For example, Al-Sabeel congregants run a small shop which carries Islamic clothing and books inside the mosque. Through these religious avenues, they assure themselves of a job and social acceptance at the same time.
The cost of wearing (or not wearing) hijab is also seen within Muslim communities themselves. The women who do not wear the hijab pay a low price within larger society because they are not instantly recognizable as the Muslim “other” (Allievi 2006). Despite their refusal to wear the hijab, they look up to the hijabi women who do pay a high price in society for wearing the veil (2006). However, the hijabi women cannot fully accept the Islamic identity of the non-hijabi women who have had to sacrifice relatively little for their Muslim identity. The result is that they often marginalize the non-hijabi and develop an exclusive group which is validated by males within the community as a religiously pious (2006).
Stefano Allievi argues that conversion is another strong reason for a woman to adopt the hijab. He says, “Conversion, as entry into another culture and another religion, presupposes strong moments that symbolically sanction the conversion itself and reinforce its significance as a radical change and clean break with the past” (2006:124). As such, the hijab symbolizes a woman’s new Muslim identity in a strong fashion (2006). The hijab is a strong social and tradtional symbol raised on the Muslim side in opposition to the decadent American society (2006). But the new converts are unrelated to any traditional or ethnic elements of Islam and must adopt some aspect of their new faith which will gain acceptance among “significant others” (2006). The hijab provides that function as well as helping a woman completely convert to a new religious identity (2006).
CONCLUSION
The American Muslim woman undoubtedly inhabits a controversial world. With one foot, she stands in the Western culture’s world of autonomy, equality, and empowerment and, with the other foot, she stands in the Eastern culture’s world of tradition, family obligations, and gendered public spheres. American society still focuses their attention on the hijab as an instrument of oppression, but the young Americans who adopt the hijab are challenging American culture’s presupposition. They claim that it represents the best of both their traditions: religious freedom and unique Islamic identity. Americans are challenged to accept the perceived extremism as an expression of religious piety and constitutional right given to all citizens no matter their faith. It will be interesting to see if the children of this present generation continue to wear the hijab or if the symbolic power of the veil will change in a generation.
Bibliography
Allievi, Stefano. 2006. “The Shifting Significance of the Halal/Haram Frontier: Narratives on the Hijab and Other Issues.” Pp. 120-149 in Women Embracing Islam:
Gender and Conversion in the West. Ed. Karin van Nieuwkerk. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Elia, Nada. 2006. “Islamophobia and the ‘Privileging’ of Arab American Women.” NWSA Journal. 18(3):155-161.
Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. 2007. “The Post-9/11 Hijab as Icon.” Sociology of Religion. 68(3):253-267.
Johnstone, Ronald L. 2007. Religion in Society: A Sociology of Religion. 8th edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Mir, Shabana. 2009. “Not too ‘College-Like,’ Not Too Normal: American Muslim Undergraduate Women’s Gendered Discourses.” Anthropology & Education
Quarterly. 40(3):237-256.
------. 2008. “It’s Not Raining Eligible Muslim Men.” Religion Dispatch. Electronic document, http://www.religiondispatches.org/archive/sexandgender/299/it’s_not_raining_eligible_muslim_men, accessed November 20, 2010.
Moaddel, Mansoor. 1998. “Religion and Women: Islamic Modernism versus Fundamentalism.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 37(1):108-130
Morsy, Rofida. 2010. Personal Interview, April 23.
Morsy, Safwat. 2010. Personal Interview, April 23.
Mule, Pat and Diane Barthel. 1992. “The Return to the Veil: Individual Autonomy vs. Social Esteem.” Sociological Forum. 7(2):323-332.
Muslim Women’s League. 1995. “Issues of Concern for Muslim Women.” Website accessed 22 November 2010. http://www.mwlusa.org/topics/equality/issues.htm
------. 1997. “An Islamic Perspective on Women’s Dress.” Website accessed 22 November 2010. http://www.mwlusa.org/topics/dress/hijab.html
Read, Jen’nan Ghazal. “Family, Religion, and Work Amoung Arab American Women.” Journal of Marriage and Family. 66(1):1042-1050.
Waldman, Peter. 2006. “Identity Crisis: At a U.S. Mosque, Path of Tolerance Leads to Tumult.” Wall Street Journal.
Williams, Rhys H. and Gira Vashi. 2007. “Hijab and American Muslim Women: Creating the Space for Autonomous Selves.” Sociology of Religion. 68(2):269-287.
ISLAM IN THE AMERICAN CONSCIOUS
Multiple authors recognize the separation in American society between “us” (Christian America) and “them” (Islam). Nada Elia, in an article entitled “Islamophobia and the ‘Privileging’ of Arab American Women,” believes that America’s advocacy of plurality does not carry over into religion (2006). It is predominately a Christian culture which paints a picture of “us,” the Christian community, versus “them,” the Islamic community. American society is riddled with both covert and overt forms of rejection which has lead to a “systematic erasure of Arab Americans from the ‘American’ consciousness” (2006:156). Arab Americans are erased from political discourses and multiculturalism (Elia 2006). Instead, the media generally represents Arabs as foreign villains who stand in opposition to American democratic values. The overt strands of rejection can be traced to the “legalized racial profiling” post-9/11 (Elia 2006:156). This includes the extra security measures put in place at the airports which seem to specifically target Arab Muslim Americans who are identified through their distinctive garb.
Part of America’s Islamophobia is the “privileging” of American Muslim women over their male counterparts who are viewed “as a menace to American society” (Elia 2006:155). Through a combination of racism and sexism, Arab women are given a greater public vocal presence then their male relatives (Elia 2006). This trend can be seen in bookstores and libraries where mostly Arab women writers are featured, and specifically those women who denounce Islam as a faith of violence and oppression (Elia 2006). Elia claims that “these Muslim women’s oppressors were invariably perceived to be their male relatives rather than the racist, exclusionary, and often violent dominant American discourse” (2006:157).
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad brings up as similar argument in his article entitled “The Post-9/11 Hijab as Icon.” Colonialists, long before 9/11, perceived Eastern men as inferior to them. Paintings from that time period present images of “vulnerable, naked women who need to be rescued by Western men” from the clutches of the barbarian Eastern men (Haddad 2007:259). Even within the paintings are marked differences between the Eastern men and women. They “present a sharp contrast between ugly, loathsome, evil (dark skinned) Eastern men and beautiful, voluptuous, innocent (light skinned) Eastern women” (Haddad 2007:259). Since 9/11, the American media has painted a different picture of oppression. With greater attention given to the Taliban atrocities, many Americans began to view Muslim women as slaves to their own religion. The new American wars in the Middle East are justified by America’s goal of liberating Eastern women from the evils of Islam (Haddad 2007).
The Muslim Women League (MWL) located in Los Angles believes that traditional Islam actually brings liberation to women, not oppression. In an article entitled “Issues of Concern for Muslim Women,” the League attempts to distinguish between cultural constructs and authentic Islamic religion. They condemn the shaping of Islamic laws to fit “political agendas” which oppress women with their “sexist and authoritarian attitudes” (1995). To the MWL, these laws “hardly resembled the original Islamic community led by Muhammad” (1995). They describe Islam as a religion which guarantees equality:
- "The current desire for change on the part of Muslim women is perhaps more borne out of the fervent belief in the image of the Muslim woman as communicated by God in the Qur'an of a liberated, vital human being who can work in cooperation with men on many levels to contribute to the betterment of society. They seek to expose this concept which has been buried by the persistence of attitudes that focus on competition and subsequent subjugation of one sex over the other in direct conflict with the spirit of the Qur'anic verse: 'And thus does their Lord answer their prayer: I shall not lose sight of the work of any of you who works (in My way) be it man or woman: You are members, one of another.'" (3:195).
During Spring semester 2010, I had the opportunity to visit during afternoon prayers Al-Sabeel Mosque in San Francisco. It was an interesting immersion into a different religion that I’m familiar with only through media and classes. A lot of media since 9/11 has portrayed Islam as a religion of violence and hatred, but I found the particular community of Al-Sabeel to be a radical departure from the normal stereotype. The moment I entered the Mosque I was treated with respect, warmth, and hospitality. The Mosque name “Al-Sabeel” means “Path to the Light” and the Mosque truly tries to be a path to what they deem as truth. They welcome everyone into their community, whether Muslim or not, and in fact provide headsets which translate the Imam’s message for non-Arabic speakers. After the afternoon prayer, Al-Sabeel provided refreshments and allowed my group to interact with the Sheikh. He was able to speak some English but most of what he communicated was through an interpreter, Mohammed Allababidi, who is also his personal assistant. Later Sheikh Morsy’s daughters, Nosiba and Rofida Morsy, went to dinner with me. Nosiba and Rofida are in their early twenties and grew up in America. They explained that their father was born in Egypt, moved to Yemen where his two eldest girls were born, then moved the family to Michigan to start a mosque. According to Rofida, her father founded Muath ibn Jabal Mosque and successfully petitioned to broadcast the call to prayer over loudspeakers outside. Once that mosque became successful the Morsy family moved on to San Francisco.
He started Al-Sabeel in 2002 in the Tenderloin district, San Francisco’s poorest neighborhood. The Sheikh explained that he endeavors to create a diverse community of Muslim believers who are intimately involved with community projects in the city. He continually emphasized that Islam promotes life, not death. At the time I was interning as a chaplain, so he suggested that I should keep Muslim patients from dwelling on death by pointing believers toward life, the opportunities that lie ahead, and the gifts they have been given. Another common theme was Morsy’s distinction between culture and religion. He purposefully tried to distance himself from the radical, oppressive Islamist countries in the Middle East by setting Al-Sabeel’s traditions in opposition to other nations. For instance, while some members of the Mosque from the Middle East might complain that he doesn’t wear traditional Islamic garbs, the Shiekh argues that the garb imams wear are culturally ascribed and thus not required. The Quran does not set out rules governing what they should wear. In fact, to the Shiekh complications in religion is by definition human not divinely created. His reasoning is that Allah wants a religion that is easy to follow. It is humans who complicate all the issues.
In some follow-up research, I ran across an article printed in the Wall Street Journal which describes Sheikh Safwat Morsy as an extremist Muslim. According to Waldman (2006), a conflict arose between Morsy and another imam named Souleiman Ghali. Morsy was fired from Ghali’s mosque, Islamic Society, for allegedly preaching radical Islamist ideals which supported martyrdom and the overthrow of the American government. Morsy filed a wrongful-termination suit in April 2003, claiming he was fired for uncovering some shady accounting. He opened Al-Sabeel a year earlier in a basement less than a block away from the Islamic Society. Waldman (2006) claims that Morsy “see[s] attempts to tailor the religion to Western norms as cultural capitulation verging on blasphemy.” In court, several congregants claimed he supported Palestinian suicide bombers and praised them for fighting against Israel and America. Waldman (2006) also claims that Morsy left the mosque in Michigan due to divisions on the board concerning Morsy’s preaching. In contrast, Rofida claimed they left because the mosque became too large and no longer needed her father’s guiding hand. But all these details became fair game in the trial in 2003. In the end, the jury ruled in favor of Sheikh Morsy and awarded him $200,000 in damages (Waldman 2006). The clinch was the Sheikh’s own testimony, self-professed pacifism, and the support of his family of seven daughters. Later I went to dinner with Nosiba and Rofida Morsy and discussed contemporary issues with them. Neither woman appeared to hold the extreme ideals of fundamentalist Muslims, despite holding more conservative beliefs. Perhaps the conflict between Morsy and Ghali was exacerbated by America’s Islamophobia.
SYMBOLIC POWER OF THE HIJAB
Sociologists recognize that the hijab (headscarf) has become a powerful symbol for both American Muslims and the general American culture. For Americans, the hijab seems to personify “Islamic militancy, extremism, jihadism, and oppression of women” (Haddad 2007:255). Stefano Allievi believes even the English translation of hijab as ‘veil’ carries strong implicit and psychological power, because it leads to an understanding that the veil is something that “separates, conceals, masks, or blocks the view” (Allievi 2006:120). In other words, it challenges the American ideal of equality by apparently forcing an individual to separate herself from the greater society by concealing herself with a headscarf. For American Muslims, the hijab is liberation from the Western women’s enslavement “to their obligation to be beautiful and available, on pain of being rejected” (Allievi 2006:120). It is also a public declaration of their faith which constructs a Muslim identity that revolves around piety and authenticity (Mir 2009). It also carves out an autonomous space for women to pursue jobs while also holding to their “traditional obligations of religion and family” (Mule and Barthel 1992:324). The hijab seamlessly combines their American and Muslim roots to create a hybrid identity that embraces the equality and religious freedom of America while also criticizing America for its sexuality and its vilification of their faith.
Shabana Mir’s study of Muslim undergraduate women illuminates the tricky balancing act of projecting “normalcy” while also differentiating themselves from their dominant majority peers’ gendered behavior (2009). For Muslim communities, youth do not date or display physical affection in public, a norm which is extremely different from the experience of American youth. Mir studied 26 Muslim undergraduate women, raised in the United States, who either attended Georgetown or George Washington University in Washington D.C. Mir discovered that the awkwardness of not having a boyfriend was mediated by half silences which preserved “an appearance of normalcy—the hint that she could have a real boyfriend (which implies a sexual relationship)—rather than say that she would not” (2009:240). Through these half silences, Muslim women often pass as normal by remaining in ambiguity and yet also distance themselves from their majority peers’ behavior by not simulating their behavior (2009). Mir calls this “normal difference.” This projection of normalcy is an attempt to correct American stereotypes (“Muslim women are backward and lack agency”) with their view (“Muslim women are normal, modern, and free”) (Mir 2009:250).
Mir’s research also uncovered the importance of the hijab in differentiating their Muslim identity from their dominant American peers. Charlise, a recent black convert, resists wearing the hijab because it “would maker her Muslim womanness concrete, remove her from a gray zone of elastic identity, and require the confirmation of a complete, consistent public performance (Mir 2009:244). By wearing the hijab, she feels the need and would want to act according to the image it creates (Mir 2009). The hijab carries with it a certain Muslim persona of piety and modesty that would restrict interactions with the opposite sex. Other women in Mir’s research, however, attempt to challenge perceptions of correct hijabi behaviors with non-hijabi behaviors. One such woman is Zeinab who wears the hijab but also develops close friendships with guys. Mir theorizes that because Zeinab is a member of “two demographically sizable and socioeconomically powerful communities,” she feels more comfortable in her identity as a Muslim and can thus challenge traditional perceptions (2009:244). In contrast, recent converts like Charlise stand on shaker ground and must conform to, rather than challenge, traditional expectations of a hijabi (Mir 2009).
In Rhys H. Williams’ and Gira Vashi’s study of Muslim youth reinforces the idea that the hijab carves out cultural space in which “second-generation Muslim young people [can] negotiate their dual identities as Muslims and Americans and gives them the opportunity to be part of both worlds” (2007:272). In Williams and Vashi’s interviews, two cultural contexts stood out as important to understanding young Muslim Americans: (1) America’s value of equal rights and (2) critiques of America’s moral standards. In the context of America’s value of equality, “treating all people the same” stands supreme (2007:275). Part of equal treatment involves dismantling barriers that might stand in the way of women’s involvement in the public arena and rejecting “any institutionally authorized sanctioning of behavior that separates the sexes” (2007:275). Under this pretext, the hijab is often vilified by the American public as a symbol of Muslim women’s second-class status (2007). In the context of Muslim critiques of America’s materialism and sexuality, respondents combined America’s allegedly moral breakdown with a general distrust of human nature when it came to sexual impulses (2007). Two concerns were apparent: either women are threatened by men’s inability to control their sexual drives or women threatened men’s purity (2007).
Muslim youth, then, must negotiate these apparently opposite viewpoints. In regards to the first context, respondents went out of their way to deny that Islam promoted gender inequality (Williams and Vashi 2007). Equality in Islam means a recognition that both sexes complement each other in terms of their function and contributions (2007). Some even claimed women were more advantaged because they could save their own money, whereas men must share their wealth with their family (2007). This is exemplified in the Muslim Women’s League’s literature:
- "Most Muslims are taught that Islam liberated women by giving them rights not previously enjoyed. Some examples include rights of ownership, decision-making in marriage, divorce and so on. Indeed, when reviewing primary Muslim sources of Qur'an and authentic Hadith (words and deeds of Prophet Muhammed), one is impressed by an overall image of men and women as equal partners as those who are expected by God to "enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong" (9:71) in all spheres of life, and to act as His vicegerents in ensuring justice, freedom and equality for all." (Muslim Women’s League 1995)
In regards to the second context, the hijab provides protection from sexual desires for both the men and the women (Williams and Vashi 2007). Rofida Morsy in my interview reflected a similar concern. The hijab to her represented modesty but she took it a step further in relating this separation between men and women to the mosque structure. She said that the separation of women and men during prayer was to allow both genders the opportunity to focus on Allah. She claims that if they worshipped together, young men would be distracted by women. Essentially, they would focus on impressing the women or struggle with sexual thoughts when they should be focused on worshipping Allah. In her case, the hijab does not fully shield young men from sexual thoughts. There is an added need for physical walls to separate men and women.
The young women in Williams and Vashi’s study also emphasized that they chose to wear the hijab despite feeling peer pressure and social expectations to make that decision (2007). Women felt by wearing the hijab they gained more respect from men because the headscarf is a visible representation of Islam and their religious values (2007). With that respect, they gained more independence:
- "Wearing hijab, an outward, public display of piety and religious identity, can finesse the constraints that conservative gender roles might impose upon them…Hijab is so symbolically loaded and so legitimate within the Islamic community…that women are insulated (at least to some degree) from reactionary backlash from Muslim men or other women (such as their mothers) protecting a traditional gender order." (Williams and Vashi 2007:283)
The young women embrace their public roles, autonomy, and chosen religion, which are inalienable rights in American society, while also donning the hijab as a distinct, traditional Muslim identity.
Rofida Morsy likewise emphasized the fact that she chose when to start wearing the head covering. She claims that technically girls begin covering their hair after they start their period, but she chose to start wearing it sooner. She wanted to mirror her older sisters and publically display her Muslim identity. To her it is an extremely important religious observance of modesty. When asked if she could have chosen not to wear the hijab, she answered yes. However, it was clear that her family would be disappointed in that choice and that there was an implicit expectation that she would wear the hijab. Her decision also reflects the conservative culture of Al-Sabeel mosque. All female attendees wear the scarf and I myself wore one when I visited out of respect.
Pat Mule and Diane Barthel in their study elaborate on how the hijab treads the fine line between autonomy and traditional values. While it focuses mainly on the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in developing countries, I think it has some bearing on Muslim American women’s perception of the hijab. In America, we have traditionally evaluated the status of women in developing countries in terms of autonomy and economic options alone (1992). Mule and Barthel argue that women’s status in society is complicated and involves a measure of autonomy but also social esteem (1992). “The traditional esteem attached to the veil are real” in its consequences (1992:326). There are costs attached to autonomy and benefits attached to traditional social esteem which increase in traditional societies and cultures (1992). Again, there is recognition that Eastern societies view Western women as sexually promiscuous. Muslim women risk associating themselves with this image if they do not wear the hijab, so “the veil is a symbol of Muslim women’s silent protest against the imposition of alien cultural constructs and ideologies that threaten to alienate them from their own heritage and to result in a loss of esteem within the patriarchal system” (1992:327). In these patriarchal societies, public spaces are often the domain of men (1992). By wearing the hijab, women can enter into gendered spaces without fear of harassment and thus, achieve some autonomy (1992). It also gives single women a degree of modest and dignity which will only be fully assured them in marriage (1992)
The hijab in America seems to achieve a similar goal. One woman in Stefano Allievi’s study describes the hijab as providing protection, identity, belonging, and even controlling deviant behavior:
- "However, apart from the fact that it is written in the Qur’an, I think the veil protects you, because that way everyone knows that you are a Muslim…which means they treat me accordingly, or at least they should. However, at least inside the community, they treat me like that and then, it sort of helps me feel inside me. For example, now that I go around in a veil I know that I have to behave accordingly, because I am like a walking symbol." (Aisha qutd. in Allievi 2006:132).
The symbol of the hijab becomes so strong that individuals within and outside the community treat the women differently. Within the Islamic community, women can enter male spaces and know that they will be accorded respect. In turn, the hijab signals to men that the woman is pious, modest, and wholly other than their promiscuous American mainstream counterparts. This distinction in Islam between the pure and impure (haram/halal) is brought to the forefront when a woman clothes herself in a veil (Allievi 2006). In a way, she brings the sacred into the profane space. The hijab also seems to mark-out women as potential marriage partners. It visibly affirms the modesty, celibacy, and piety of an unmarried hijabi woman, something that pious Muslim men would look for. An anonymous writer on the Muslim Women’s League’s website writes:
- "The scarf, an article of clothing, has sadly become a litmus test for a Muslim woman’s faith and devotion to God. Indeed, the importance which some Muslims have attached to hijab has made some sarcastically refer to it as the "Sixth Pillar" of Islam, on par with prayer, fasting, alms-giving, pilgrimage and bearing witness to the oneness of God…In addition, the extremely negative attitudes which consider women who do not cover as somehow unchaste are most egregious and unjustifiable." (1997)
Yet women must also pay a price when they wear traditional clothing in a nontraditional society. After 9/11, Rofida Morsy says she experienced a lot of stares and rude comments. At first she either rudely stared back or stuck-out her tongue in response to other American’s reaction to the hijab. Now she says she experiences less discrimination and learned how to cope with the occasional unwanted attention. Besides unwanted attention, Allievi points out that hijabi women run the risk of either being unable to find a job or possibly even losing their job because of dress codes. He believes the job problem is often mitigated by opening religious businesses such as an Islamic clothing line (2006:139). For example, Al-Sabeel congregants run a small shop which carries Islamic clothing and books inside the mosque. Through these religious avenues, they assure themselves of a job and social acceptance at the same time.
The cost of wearing (or not wearing) hijab is also seen within Muslim communities themselves. The women who do not wear the hijab pay a low price within larger society because they are not instantly recognizable as the Muslim “other” (Allievi 2006). Despite their refusal to wear the hijab, they look up to the hijabi women who do pay a high price in society for wearing the veil (2006). However, the hijabi women cannot fully accept the Islamic identity of the non-hijabi women who have had to sacrifice relatively little for their Muslim identity. The result is that they often marginalize the non-hijabi and develop an exclusive group which is validated by males within the community as a religiously pious (2006).
Stefano Allievi argues that conversion is another strong reason for a woman to adopt the hijab. He says, “Conversion, as entry into another culture and another religion, presupposes strong moments that symbolically sanction the conversion itself and reinforce its significance as a radical change and clean break with the past” (2006:124). As such, the hijab symbolizes a woman’s new Muslim identity in a strong fashion (2006). The hijab is a strong social and tradtional symbol raised on the Muslim side in opposition to the decadent American society (2006). But the new converts are unrelated to any traditional or ethnic elements of Islam and must adopt some aspect of their new faith which will gain acceptance among “significant others” (2006). The hijab provides that function as well as helping a woman completely convert to a new religious identity (2006).
CONCLUSION
The American Muslim woman undoubtedly inhabits a controversial world. With one foot, she stands in the Western culture’s world of autonomy, equality, and empowerment and, with the other foot, she stands in the Eastern culture’s world of tradition, family obligations, and gendered public spheres. American society still focuses their attention on the hijab as an instrument of oppression, but the young Americans who adopt the hijab are challenging American culture’s presupposition. They claim that it represents the best of both their traditions: religious freedom and unique Islamic identity. Americans are challenged to accept the perceived extremism as an expression of religious piety and constitutional right given to all citizens no matter their faith. It will be interesting to see if the children of this present generation continue to wear the hijab or if the symbolic power of the veil will change in a generation.
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